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Yellow Flag Fever: Describing Negative Legal 
Precedent in Citators*
Aaron S. Kirschenfeld**
This study analyzes the accuracy with which descriptions of subsequent negative 
treatment are applied by online citators. A system making use of a hierarchical con-
trolled vocabulary applying these descriptions appears marginally more accurate, but 
the citator’s traditional role in legal research must be reconceptualized.
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Flying the Flag: An Introduction
¶1 Iconography without meaning is no iconography at all. Imagine if tomor-
row we were to look at the Star Spangled Banner and think not of America but 
instead emotionlessly identify vaguely with thoughts of a shapeless, formless, but 
nonetheless large country in the Western Hemisphere. This scenario would make 
our flag’s symbolic power next to nil because a symbol’s sine qua non is to convey 
a coherent, readily grasped message. This much, without delving into the past half 
century of semiotics and linguistics, we should be able to say is true, especially 
when the object of the symbol is to communicate concrete meaning to subject-
matter experts seeking answers. The flag’s place at the center of a town’s Fourth of 
July celebrations is discursively rich, but its use as a small digital image to be clicked 
on when setting up a new computer, indicating that U.S. English is the desired 
keyboard configuration, should not need to be. 
¶2 This study began with a question: do the symbols and phrases used in com-
mercial online citators adequately convey meaning to legal researchers? Based on 
the study’s findings, I posit that serious questions surround the citator’s place in 
legal research. I then provide suggestions for teaching students and practitioners 
how to best use citators. Among other things, I suggest that legal information 
 * © Aaron S. Kirschenfeld, 2016. This is a revised version of the winning entry in the student 
division of the 2015 AALL/LexisNexis Call for Papers Competition.
 ** Reference & Digital Initiatives Law Librarian, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
Kathrine R. Everett Law Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
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professionals bear the responsibility of questioning legal information vendors 
about the accuracy of their citator products. I also offer areas of further research 
for developing a more robust, rigorous literature on citators as legal research prod-
ucts. Finally, I present alternatives to traditional citators that might someday sub-
sume their functions, including citation analysis tools based on visualization or on 
algorithmic extraction and presentation of subsequent negative treatment.
¶3 But let us start our inquiry with some first principles. The system of com-
mon law1 as practiced in the United States depends on the doctrine of stare decisis, 
or in adhering to precedent established in earlier cases. Judges in state appellate 
courts rely on precedent from their own jurisdictions and are sometimes bound by 
it, but also consider precedent from other states, which can be seen as persuasive 
authority. On constitutional issues, state judges must defer to pronouncements of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Judges in federal district courts look to precedent from the 
appellate court from the geographic circuit they practice within when interpreting 
federal law, and to the Supreme Court as well. Precedent from other circuits may 
also be persuasive. And state law precedent binds federal courts in diversity of 
jurisdiction actions.2 In this system of overlapping, often complex, authority, 
lawyers must research and argue based on judicial precedent and its application to 
their particular clients’ facts. Not only is finding precedent that supports clients’ 
desired outcomes necessary, however; lawyers must also find precedent that calls 
into question their arguments.  As the title suggests, this article focuses on the sec-
ond type of precedent.
¶4 One tool in lawyers’ arsenals for accomplishing this—specifically in deter-
mining cases’ precedential value—is the citation index, or citator. Major commer-
cial online citators signal negative treatment of a case using one general form: an 
introductory symbol—such as a colored flag or a colored shape—followed by an 
explanatory phrase. The appearance of both of these elements varies greatly among 
the two major citators, KeyCite (Westlaw) and Shepard’s (LexisNexis). Some minor 
citators, such as Bad Law Bot (Fastcase), do not include both elements. These prod-
ucts rarely agree on the meaning of these explanations of subsequent negative 
treatment. But do these differences in characterization of a case’s negative treat-
ment affect how citators themselves, as well as the lawyers who use them, evaluate 
the case’s significance in common-law precedent?
¶5 I propose that when a standardized and hierarchical controlled vocabulary 
is applied to a legal citation indexing system, evaluation of a case’s subsequent 
negative treatment is more accurate. Knowing whether this proposition is valid will 
help inform lawyers, law librarians, and teachers of legal research in addition to 
legal information vendors. The LexisNexis Shepard’s product is an example of a 
hierarchical controlled vocabulary of subsequent negative treatment. In contrast, 
KeyCite uses language from cases to produce explanatory phrases describing sub-
sequent negative treatment. Both systems use symbols to represent subsequent 
negative treatment as well.
 1. The term “common law” is used in an informal sense, given that so much law in the United 
States is statutory or regulatory in nature. However, judges do still make law by interpreting legislative 
actions and other cases, and their decisions can still be said to be meaningfully different from those 
in countries practicing civil law.
 2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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¶6 After review of a set of cases in Shepard’s and KeyCite, described in the 
methodology below, the results suggest, absent the action of other variables, that 
citators using a hierarchical controlled vocabulary do describe subsequent negative 
history more accurately than those that do not. Shepard’s performs better than 
KeyCite by applying explanatory phrases more accurately in the limited sense 
tested. Shepard’s also performs better in applying introductory symbols more accu-
rately. To that end, this article introduces an operationalized definition of “accu-
racy” and a method for determining whether descriptions of negative precedent 
have been applied accurately. 
Looking Backward: Reviewing the Relevant Literature
¶7 Legal research instructional materials and courses emphasize the importance 
of updating one’s research before submitting a legal work to a publisher, court, or 
other lawmaking body.3 Updating involves revisiting selected documents to deter-
mine whether they still represent the most current law. (While citators are used to 
update statutory, regulatory, and case law materials, this article focuses on legal 
precedent found in case law.) Usually, a lesson on using citators involves a variation 
on a familiar theme in the law—fear of incompetence. Young lawyers who fail to 
update a case will find themselves in hot water, and fast. This is no doubt true—
judges do not generally look kindly on counsel whose arguments rest on shaky 
precedent.4 Others have raised the question of whether the failure to update a case 
is a violation of a lawyer’s professional ethical obligations.5
¶8 To date, academic research on citators has fallen into one of two general 
camps: (1) the history and development of citators, and (2) wholesale comparisons 
of Shepard’s Citations and West’s KeyCite.6 While interesting in its own right, a 
thorough review of the literature on the history and development of citators is 
unwarranted here, though it is treated in some depth in this article’s discussion 
section.7 More significant are the attempts—made both by law librarians and by 
 3. See, e.g., J. Armstrong & christoPher A. Knott, Where the lAW is: An introduction to 
AdvAnced legAl reseArch 143 (4th ed. 2013); scott childs & sArA sAmPson, north cArolinA legAl 
reseArch 143 (2d ed. 2014); morris l. cohen & Kent c. olson, legAl reseArch in A nutshell 108 
(10th ed. 2010); Kent c. olson, PrinciPles of legAl reseArch 288 (2009); mArK K. osBecK, imPec-
cABle reseArch: A concise guide to mAstering legAl reseArch sKills 51 (2010).
 4. Lisa McElroy, Motivating Students to Use Citators: Lessons from Litigation, 18 PersP.: teAching 
legAl res. & Writing 140 (2010).
 5. Carol M. Bast & Susan W. Harrell, Ethical Obligations: Performing Adequate Legal Research 
and Legal Writing, 29 novA l. rev. 49 (2004).
 6. See, e.g., Laura C. Dabney, Citators: Past, Present, and Future, 27 legAl reference servs. q. 
165 (2008); Michael J. Lynch, Citators in the Early Twentieth Century—Not Just Shepard’s, 16 legAl 
reference servs. q., 1998, no. 3, at 5; Patti Ogden, Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law: A Story of 
Legal Citation Indexes, 85 lAW liBr. J. 1 (1993). For the institutional history, see frAnK shePArd co., A 
record of fifty yeArs of sPeciAlizing in A field thAt is of first imPortAnce to the Bench And BAr 
of the united stAtes: An insight into An estABlishment thAt hAs groWn from smAll Beginnings 
to the first rAnK in the lAW PuBlishing field (1923). For the intriguing argument that citation 
indexing began with law, see Fred R. Shapiro, Origins of Bibliometrics, Citation Indexing, and Citation 
Analysis: The Neglected Legal Literature, 43 J. Am. soc’y info. sci. 337 (1992). 
 7. Specifically, the claim that citation indexing was part of a late nineteenth-century classifica-
tion trend as noted in geoffrey c. BoWKer & susAn leigh stAr, sorting things out: clAssificAtion 
And its consequences 16 (1999).
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employees of the legal information vendors—to differentiate the market-leading 
citators at different points in time.8 
¶9 Perhaps the leading, albeit dated, comparison of citators (following the 
introduction of KeyCite in the mid-1990s) is Taylor’s 2000 article in Law Library 
Journal. He compared Shepard’s and KeyCite for three factors: completeness, cur-
rency, and accuracy. He defined accuracy as “whether the system correctly identifies 
all citing opinions that have a negative effect on the validity or persuasiveness of 
the cited opinion.”9 Because he was assessing the citator holistically, this definition 
suited his purposes. But it more describes the concept of “recall” than “accuracy.” 
Taylor’s study, however, supplies a framework for talking about the types of infor-
mation found in citators, and his vocabulary is discussed in this article’s section on 
methodology.
¶10 That said, in other studies assessing the accuracy of a controlled vocabu-
lary, the term is meant as a study in the accuracy of application—for example, were 
all articles about cholesterol-lowering drugs marked with one of the correct subject 
terms relating to cholesterol-lowering drugs?10 Again, this is sensible when using 
“accuracy” to judge an information system as whole, and roughly aligns with Tay-
lor’s recall-heavy definition. This article’s operational definition of “accuracy” dif-
fers slightly due to the special nature and needs of a legal citation index and the 
quality this study purports to test. 
¶11 In general, Taylor and similar older comparisons of citators conclude that 
each commercial system has its strengths and weaknesses, and that truly effective 
legal researchers ought to consult both Shepard’s and KeyCite to ensure correctness. 
The legal information vendors also had their say in response to Taylor.11 More recent 
comparisons of citators have looked at the citator’s place within the online legal 
research product context—that is, how the citator behaves in relation to other parts 
of a unified tool containing hundreds of legal databases. Mart has studied both 
Shepard’s and KeyCite for their relative strengths (or, as it turns out, weaknesses) 
when accessed through case law subject headings, or “headnotes.”12 The difference 
 8. And timing did have a lot to do with it. KeyCite was developed in the 1990s, and many of 
these comparative studies attempted to benchmark it to Shepard’s. See Elizabeth M. McKenzie, Com-
paring KeyCite with Shepard’s Online, 17 legAl reference servs. q., 1999, no. 3, at 85 [hereinafter 
McKenzie, Comparing KeyCite]; Elizabeth M. McKenzie, New Kid on the Block: KeyCite Compared 
to Shepard’s, AAll sPectrum, Oct. 1998, at 8. For a more recent comparison, see Carol A. Levitt & 
Mark Rosch, Are All Citator Services Created Equal? A Comparison of Google Scholar, Fastcase, Case-
maker, LexisNexis, WestlawNext, and Bloomberg (Internet for Laws white paper, 2012), http://www 
.netforlawyers.com/content/caselaw-citators-comparison-Google%20Scholar-Fastcase-Casemaker 
-LexisNexis-WestlawNext-Bloomberg-0059.
 9. William L. Taylor, Comparing KeyCite and Shepard’s for Completeness, Currency, and Accu-
racy, 92 lAW liBr. J. 127, 132, 2000 lAW liBr. J. 13, ¶ 21. For an earlier and less comprehensive effort, 
see Fred R. Shapiro, KeyCite and Shepard’s—Coverage and Currency of Citations to Recent Cases: A 
Comparative Study, legAl info. Alert, Apr. 1998, at 1.
 10. Natalie Kupferberg & Bridget McCrate Protus, Accuracy and Completeness of Drug Informa-
tion in Wikipedia: An Assessment, 99 J. med. liBr. Ass’n 310 (2011).
 11. Jane W. Morris, A Response to Taylor’s Comparison of Shepard’s and KeyCite, 92 lAW liBr. J. 
143, 2000 lAW liBr. J. 14; Daniel P. Dabney, Another Response to Taylor’s Comparison of KeyCite and 
Shepard’s, 92 lAW liBr. J. 381, 2000 lAW liBr. J. 33.
 12. Susan Nevelow Mart, The Case for Curation: The Relevance of Digest and Citator Results in 
Westlaw and Lexis, 32 legAl reference servs. q. 13 (2013).
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that Mart fixes on is between human-generated headnotes and algorithm-generated 
headnotes, and she studies how inclusive each type of headnote is in listing cases 
cited. Mart’s article does assume that the Shepard’s explanatory phrases are both 
generated or selected and applied by human editors, while the KeyCite explanatory 
phrases are likely generated or selected and applied algorithmically.13 But this is 
merely an assumption based on a general impression of the data gathered, not on 
any otherwise verifiable information. And this point will not be a focus of the article, 
as it presents what is likely a distinction without a difference—the object of this 
study is the explanatory phrases themselves and whether or not they are accurately 
applied to the judicial disposition in a case, not how they were generated. Mart’s 
conclusions ultimately echo those in earlier citator comparisons in the narrow sense: 
both products are flawed, but flawed in different ways.14
¶12 Some in the profession have questioned whether the companies that market 
citators ought to claim that their descriptions of subsequent negative treatment 
“validate” case law.15 Updating case law or checking citations is no simple task. 
Regardless of what the citator claims about the treatment of a case, there will be 
misapplications or gaps in coverage. Yet substantial anecdotal evidence suggests 
that lawyers accept the companies’ claims about validity more or less unquestion-
ingly.16 This perspective from actual lawyers adds urgency to our problem. Validity 
follows from perceived accuracy, and challenges to the role and uses of citators in 
attorney’s legal research will be discussed following the presentation of this study’s 
results.
¶13 Literature about standardized controlled vocabularies, judicial precedent, 
and citation indexing in general are most useful to this article’s task. Studies of law-
specific controlled vocabularies have focused on the difficult nature of selecting 
terms using literary warrant—or classification based on the content of the informa-
tion resources being classified—in case law collections.17 (And, interestingly, none 
treat the distinction between literary warrant and end-user warrant—or classifica-
tion based on how the information’s users themselves conceptualize it—in the law.) 
On the whole, both the legal information literature and the academic literature 
concern the generation of controlled vocabularies or the appropriateness of terms 
chosen, but neither touches on something as specific as what is being studied here. 
In all, researchers seem to be concerned with studying the systems themselves or 
their effect on the legal profession or jurisprudence conceptually, rather than the 
effect that the system might have on particular users in particular instances, or on 
particular information objects. And of course, these are all worthy and interesting 
pursuits; some will even be taken up later in this article. But there are very few user 
studies of legal researchers and none, to my knowledge, focused solely on the use of 
 13. But see McKenzie, Comparing KeyCite,  supra note 8, at 91.
 14. Mart, supra note 12, at 43.
 15. Alan Wolf & Lynn Wishart, Shepard’s and KeyCite Are Flawed (or Maybe It’s You), n.y. st. B. 
Ass’n J., Sept. 2003, at 24.
 16. Id. at 25.
 17. See, e.g., Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PrAc. 
& Process 305 (2000); Daniel P. Dabney, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary Warrant and 
West’s Key Number System, 99 lAW liBr. J. 229, 2006 lAW liBr. J. 14.
82 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 108:1  [2016-4]
citators.18 And while this article is not a user study, it does aim to address this gap 
in the literature.19
¶14 The literature on the application of standards, specifically ANSI/NISO 
Z39.19 2005, to collections has been helpful, although ultimately limited. As with 
some of the studies mentioned earlier, the measure of “accuracy” is more about 
consistency in application rather than correctness or perceived usefulness. The 
studies of standards tend to consider issues of whether application of terms is “cor-
rect” rather than “useful.” Here, of course, we are concerned with the latter. That 
said, the standard is also relatively new, meaning that there have been few substan-
tive studies on it since its publication and adoption by information professionals. 
The standard itself does, however, offer methods for assessing controlled 
vocabularies.
¶15 While the literature on Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) is well devel-
oped, it lacks relevance when applied to legal subject matter in one key respect: 
medical article and citation indexing does not, at least to this point, employ judg-
ments of subsequent negative treatment.20 This article might be able to shed light 
on an issue not yet taken up in other professional communities—which way is best 
to express when articles or hypotheses, like cases or points of law, are challenged, 
distinguished, or even discredited. And while law is not a science—and American 
writers in the field have to be given credit for acknowledging such, at least since the 
late nineteenth century—its peculiar crucible of precedent developed through trial 
and appeal can be seen as an analogue to work in more practice-oriented sciences 
like medicine.
¶16 Finally, a look into whether “subsequent negative treatment” has itself been 
satisfactorily defined is needed. In short, the literature on this topic is in one sense 
quite large, but for the most part focuses on the concepts of legal change or of 
“compliance,” that is, whether cases actually follow other cases, and to what 
degree.21 This literature tends to come from the political science community, and 
is probably not relevant here. However, compliance is a larger inclusive category for 
study of the common law doctrine of stare decisis, or judicial precedent. The legal 
 18. For an interesting recent survey on lawyer use of information, see All-sis tAsK force 
on identifying sKills & KnoWledge for legAl PrActice, A study of Attorneys’ legAl reseArch 
PrActices And oPinions of neW AssociAtes’ reseArch sKills (June 2013), http://www.aallnet.org 
/sections/all/storage/committees/practicetf/final-report-07102013.pdf. 
 19. That said, David L. Armond & Shawn G. Nevers, The Practitioners’ Council: Connecting Legal 
Research Instruction and Current Legal Research Practice, 103 lAW liBr. J. 575, 2011 lAW liBr. J. 36, 
provides an interesting, if sobering, take on the difficulty of engaging practicing lawyers in a discus-
sion of legal resources.
 20. Mark E. Funk & Carolyn Anne Reid, Indexing Consistency in MEDLINE, 71 Bull. med. liBr. 
Ass’n 176, 183 (1983). 
 21. See, e.g., James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Measuring Legal Change: The Reliability 
and Validity of Shepard’s Citations, 53 Pol. res. q. 327 (2000). For particular studies, see Scott D. 
McClurg & Scott A. Comparato, Rebellious or Just Misunderstood? Assessing Measures of Lower Court 
Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, in AnnuAl meeting of the AmericAn PoliticAl 
science AssociAtion, PhilAdelPhiA (2003); James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Incorporation and Interpretation of Precedent, 36 lAW & soc’y rev. 139 (2002); see 
also Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to 
Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. Pol. 534 (2002).
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literature is low on systematic studies of stare decisis, and usually (and necessarily) 
focuses on one jurisdiction in depth. Alternatively, one could say that the entire 
focus of fields of jurisprudential study is the nature and meaning of stare decisis. I 
mention this because in each cited case studied below, an analysis of the case’s 
meaning and what has happened to it, dispositively, after its decision and publica-
tion, is relevant to determining the accuracy of evaluation. Considerations of the 
notion of the rule of law and its relation to having publicized, well-described prec-
edent deserve special mention, as well.22
¶17 The scholarly and professional literature, then, has not touched directly on 
the issue at study here but does suggest appropriate methodological approaches. 
Methodology 
¶18 The story of the dataset used in this study is somewhat tortuous and 
deserves a clear explanation. In 2013, I worked as a summer research associate with 
Fastcase, Inc., the online legal research company. As part of my work, I performed 
a quality assurance analysis on the Bad Law Bot software, testing several features of 
the automated citator product.23 My work on Bad Law Bot increased my interest in 
citators, and Fastcase CEO Ed Walters allowed me to keep a copy of the spreadsheet 
used in the quality assurance analysis and to use the data in this study.
¶19 Before I began my project at Fastcase, the following data had been collected: 
the Bad Law Bot algorithm then in existence identified 44,624 cases in the Fastcase 
database as negative. While the algorithm is proprietary, its construction at the time 
was quite simple. In essence, the algorithm searched for instances of negative sub-
sequent case treatment using “explanatory phrases” from table 8 of the Bluebook.24 
Of those cases, 3800 were selected for hand-tagging by Fastcase staff. 
¶20 Staff members searched for these cases in the WestlawNext database and 
recorded the flag color associated with the case from the integrated KeyCite prod-
uct. KeyCite assigned Red Flags to 3465 of the cases. Of the cases remaining, 
approximately thirty-two percent (108) were not flagged, and sixty-eight percent 
(227) were assigned a Yellow Flag. 
¶21 WestlawNext user guides explain that the Yellow Flag “warns that the case 
has some negative history, but hasn’t been reversed.”25 This independently con-
ducted study begins with the set of 227 Yellow Flag cases, which, of course, had also 
been identified as “negative” by the Bad Law Bot algorithm. To study the phrases 
 22. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in the Authority of lAW: essAys on lAW 
And morAlity 210, 217 (1979), for one view on the importance of publicity and predictability in the 
law.
 23. For a bit more information about how the product works, see Introducing Bad Law Bot from 
Fastcase, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZsKu7FoO2Ns (last visited Dec. 7, 2015) [https://perma 
.cc/5XK9-QCRN].
 24. the BlueBooK: A uniform system of citAtion tbl. 8, at 500 (20th ed. 2015). The phrases, 
according to the Bluebook, are “commonly used to indicate prior or subsequent history and weight of 
authority of judicial decisions.” Id. at 500.
 25. Keycite on WestlAW next (2012), https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/wln2 
/L-356347.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) [http://perma.cc/WS2F-C73Q]. 
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explaining negative subsequent case law treatment, 116 of the 227 Yellow Flag cases 
were selected for further analysis. These cases were selected because their KeyCite 
entries consisted only of what Taylor called “unrelated opinions,” those in which 
“the citing opinion is from a different legal matter but has some effect on the per-
suasiveness of the cited opinion.”26 KeyCite calls these unrelated opinions “negative 
citing references” as opposed to negative direct history, which Taylor calls “related 
opinions . . . , where the citing opinion is a later phase of the same legal matter, such 
as appeals, rehearings en banc, substituted opinions, or supplemental opinions.”27 
¶22 To summarize, then, cases identified in WestlawNext’s KeyCite having 
direct negative history were excluded from the data examined here. This was done 
to keep the focus on the descriptions of precedent in later-citing cases. Another way 
to think of this is to imagine three hypothetical cases: Case A, Case B, and Case C. 
Case A states a proposition of law. Case B in some way acts on the proposition of 
law stated in Case A. (Case B, then, is an example of a related opinion.) Finally, in 
Case C, the action of Case B on Case A is somehow memorialized. Case C is an 
unrelated opinion, from a different legal matter, but describing the proposition of 
law stated in Case A. 
¶23 These terms are useful ways of talking about the same phenomena. How-
ever, since there is no other vocabulary for discussing subsequent negative treat-
ment, a few more terms of art may help in the study that follows. I call the case 
being updated or “Shepardized” the “Target Case.” The term is analogous to Case A, 
but feels somewhat less clinical and is more geared to a researcher’s actual needs. 
Locating the Citing Case, namely a relevant one, is the result of using a citator. We 
are primarily concerned with a Negative Citing Case, which is analogous to the idea 
of Case C. Finally, the Acting Case refers to the case commenting on the Target 
Case. This is the same as Case B. The relationship between Case B and Case A, the 
Acting Case and the Target Case, is the subsequent negative treatment and is 
expressed in a Negative Citing Case, or a Case C. Descriptions of subsequent nega-
tive treatment, and their accuracy, are the narrow focus of this study.
¶24 For the 116 cases analyzed, seventeen individual pieces of data were col-
lected. Some data were collected to ensure that the proper case was being analyzed—
identification data such as the case’s name, date of decision, and one or more cita-
tions associated with the case. Other data fields record the subsequent negative 
treatment in the databases studied. The seventeen data fields are listed in table 1, 
with brief descriptions of their content.
¶25 All data have been both collected or checked by me personally and, to the 
best of my knowledge, are current though at least January 2015 (though some data 
collection continued into February and March). To gather and check the data, I 
used my law student access to WestlawNext and LexisNexis (or “Lexis.com” linked 
from the Lexis Advance platform). And while the dataset is hosted in its entirety in 
.xlsx format in full on my personal website,28 I offer a sample record in table 2 for 
a particular case to aid in understanding of why these data might be useful.
 26. Taylor, supra note 9, at 131, ¶ 14.
 27. Id.
 28. Subsequent Negative Treatment Dataset, http://perma.cc/XJB4-KZ7Z (last visited Nov. 18, 
2015).
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¶26 For the Target Case in table 2 we can reconstruct a picture in textual form 
from these data. The Target Case was decided in federal court in 1994. KeyCite 
applies the Yellow Flag, asserting that the most negative Citing Case “declined to 
follow” the Target Case. Shepard’s applies the Yellow Triangle symbol and asserts 
that most negative Citing Case “criticized” Target Case. The most negative Citing 
Case in both products was the same (787 F. Supp. 2d 961). The Bad Law Bot algo-
rithm, however, identified that the Target Case was “overruled on other grounds” by 
the Acting Case, and this fact was recorded in a Citing Case different from the one 
selected by KeyCite and Shepard’s. Numerous questions possibly flow from these 
Table 1
Descriptions of Data Collected
Data Field Description of Data Field
Target Case Name Name of the Target Case in short form
Decision Date Year, month, and day of decision
Target Case Citations Citations identifying the case from the West National Reporter System 
or Federal Reports (F. Supp, F., and S. Ct.), from official reports, or, for 
more recent unreported opinions, the case name, court of decision, 
and year (eschewing Westlaw or LexisNexis citations)
Jurisdiction Federal or State
Flag Color on WLN For all Target Cases analyzed in this study, the Flag Color on 
WestlawNext was Yellow
# of Neg. Treatment on WLN The number of cases identified as “Negative Citing References” on 
WestlawNext’s KeyCite
WLN Neg. Treatment The Citing Case identified as “Most Negative” among the Negative 
Citing References
Symbol on LEX The graphical Shepard’s “signal” for the Target Case
# of Neg. Treatment on LEX After selecting “All Neg” in the Shepard’s report, the number of “Citing 
Decisions” listed on the report
LEX Neg. Treatment Identified by selecting the most negative Citing Case within the 
Shepard’s report
# of Neg. Treatment on FC In the Fastcase Authority Check report, the number of cases flagged by 
the Bad Law Bot algorithm
FC Neg. Treatment The top result in the list of negative Citing Cases identified by Bad Law 
Bot
FC Acting Case The case identified by Bad Law Bot as the case acting on the Target 
Case
Classification on WLN The phrase used in WestlawNext to describe the subsequent negative 
treatment in the “Most Negative” Citing Case
Classification on LEX The phrase used in the Shepard’s report to describe the subsequent 
negative treatment in the most negative Citing Case
Classification on FC The phrase describing the relationship between the Target Case and 
the Acting Case, as identified by Bad Law Bot and generally drawn from 
table 8 of the Bluebook
Quote from FC BLB A full quote of the sentence that contains the description of the  
relationship between the Target Case and Acting Case on Fastcase
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data. The one we are concerned with, however, is: which phrase, if any, is an accu-
rate description of subsequent negative treatment for the Target Case? 
¶27 To analyze descriptions of subsequent negative treatment, Target Cases 
having matching Citing Cases were collected, read, and assessed.29 Absent other 
methods of conducting this type of analysis, this seemed most likely to yield useful, 
practical results for lawyers and legal information professionals. If the most nega-
tive Citing Cases match on at least two of the citators tested, it can be assumed that 
users should presume these cases present the same subsequent negative treatment. 
The question here is whether a hierarchical controlled vocabulary term, like those 
employed by Shepard’s, is a more accurate description of subsequent negative 
treatment than the uncontrolled systems used by KeyCite.30
 29. Note that the example from table 2 meets this criterion and was subject to the analysis 
described below. 
 30. List of Analysis Definitions Grouped by Shepard’s Signals, lexisnexis (available to LexisNexis 
subscribers at https://www.lexisadvance.com/; archived at http://perma.cc/XK4R-U6WW). The 
comparable WestlawNext document for KeyCite does not mention the explanatory phrases, let alone 
describe or classify them. See checKing citAtions in Keycite (2010), http://blog.legalsolutions.
Table 2
Sample of Data Collected for One Case
Data Field Data Collected
Target Case Name Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc.
Decision Date 4/22/1994
Target Case Citations 19 F3d 586 (note the absence of punctuation and spacing; entering this 
citation format into the databases tested works well)
Jurisdiction Federal
Flag Color on WLN Yellow
# of Neg. Treatment on WLN 14
WLN Neg. Treatment 787 F.Supp.2d 961
Symbol on Lex Yellow Triangle
# of Neg. Treatment on Lex 8
Lex Neg. Treatment 787 F. Supp. 2d 961
# of Neg. Treatment on FC 2
FC Neg. Treatment 767 F.Supp.2d 1233
FC Acting Case 338 F.3d 1304
Classification on WLN Declined to Follow by
Classification on Lex Criticized by
Classification on FC overruled on other grounds
Quote from FC BLB 
 
“(citing Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8 (11th Cir. 
1994), overruled on other grounds, Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 
1328 n.52 (11th Cir. 2003)”
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Results
¶28 In the 116-case dataset, 31 Target Cases had matching “most negative” Cit-
ing Cases in Shepard’s and KeyCite. That is, twenty-six percent of the time the two 
market-leading citator products agreed about which case best provided subsequent 
negative treatment. While this may seem surprising, I do not think the result is 
particularly meaningful as a measure of the reliability of either product or both 
products. First, “related cases” assigned direct or procedural negative history were 
excluded—nearly half of the original 227 Yellow Flag cases. I would hypothesize 
that there is greater alignment among related cases, though this question will not 
be considered further in this article. However, the seventy-four percent rate of dis-
agreement between citators is taken up in its proper context in the discussion 
section.
¶29 What is more troubling to the analysis here is the “most negative” designa-
tion as a distinctive, meaningful metric. Only KeyCite explicitly identifies a most 
negative case for a given Target Case. Shepard’s does not make an explicit determi-
nation of which case in its report is most negative. That said, the decision of which 
case was chosen as most negative was far from arbitrary. The Shepard’s system is a 
hierarchy from most negative to least negative (Red Hexagon/Q in Orange Box/→ 
Yellow Triangle), with each analysis definition falling under a particular visual sig-
nal.31 On the Shepard’s Report page, a box summarizes this ordering near the top 
of the page. The most negative case was selected by locating the first result in the 
most negative set of Citing Cases. Still, I do not expect a practitioner looks only at 
the case in a citator listed as most negative for the Target Case she is researching. As 
noted earlier, a user study of attorneys and other expert legal researchers would be 
needed to learn how these people use citators. We only know, of course, that 
researchers do use them. 
¶30 These challenges aside, the thirty-one cases with identical most negative 
Citing Cases can tell us quite a bit about the language used to describe subsequent 
negative treatment in Shepard’s and KeyCite. First of all, twelve of the thirty-one 
cases, or thirty-nine percent, used identical language to describe subsequent nega-
tive treatment. Interestingly, these twelve instances all involved the same explana-
tory phrase: “distinguished by.” Two additional cases were assigned near-identical 
language: “disapproved by” (Shepard’s) and “disapproved of by” (KeyCite). That 
leaves seventeen cases in which different terms were used to describe subsequent 
negative treatment for a Target Case. This group of seventeen cases was analyzed for 
differences between each citator’s accuracy in applying subsequent negative treat-
ment phrases. 
¶31 Four of the Shepard’s phrases are present in this final collection of cases: 
“criticized by,” “distinguished by,” “overruled in part by,” and “questioned by.” 
Shepard’s defines these phrases as:
thomsonreuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/wlnkeyci.pdf [http://perma.cc/E634-NNSX]. Bad 
Law Bot, of course, does not generate its own explanatory phrases, but rather captures the ones used 
by courts in Citing Cases.
 31. List of Analysis Definitions Grouped by Shepard’s Signals, supra note 30.
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Criticized by—The citing opinion disagrees with the reasoning/result of the case you are 
Shepardizing, although the citing court may not have the authority to materially affect its 
precedential value. 
Distinguished by—The Citing Case differs from the case you are Shepardizing, either 
involving dissimilar facts or requiring a different application of the law.
Overruled in part by—One or more parts of the decision you are Shepardizing have been 
expressly nullified by the subsequent decision from the same court, thus casting some 
doubt on the precedential value of the case you are Shepardizing.
Questioned by—The citing opinion questions the continuing validity or precedential value 
of the case you are Shepardizing because of intervening circumstances, including judicial or 
legislative overruling.32
¶32 According to Shepard’s, the “criticized by” and “distinguished by” phrases 
should be assigned the Yellow Triangle signal, meaning “caution.”33 “Overruled in 
part by” should be assigned the Red Hexagon signal, meaning “warning.”34 “Ques-
tioned by” should be assigned the Q in Orange Box signal, meaning “questioned.”35 
“Criticized by,” “distinguished by,” and “questioned by” are considered to be “com-
mon analysis phrases.”36 Thus it can be inferred that, as common phrases, these 
would likely be encountered by a researcher while he conducts legal research. 
¶33 Seven KeyCite analytical phrases are used in describing the subsequent 
negative treatment in the final seventeen cases studied: “called into doubt by,” 
“criticized by,” “declined to extend by,” “declined to follow by,” “disagreed with by,” 
“not followed as dicta,” and “rejected by.” As mentioned earlier, WestlawNext does 
not define these phrases. The phrases, in the large dataset, appear in combination 
with either a Red Flag or Yellow Flag, the only two symbols used by KeyCite. These 
facts support two propositions. First, that KeyCite’s system of applying analytical 
phrases to cases is not an example of a hierarchical controlled vocabulary. Second, 
it will be more difficult to assess whether the phrases have been applied to cases 
accurately because the definitions of the phrases are necessarily somewhat subjec-
tive.37 Words such as “disagreed”38 and “doubt”39 suggest common definitions while 
“dicta” is a legal term of art.40 “Followed,”41 “extend,”42 and “rejected”43 seem to be 
 32. Id.
 33. lexisnexis, shePArd’s signAl indicAtors And AnAlysis PhrAses At lexis.com (2012), http://
www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20120605102055_large.pdf [http://perma.cc/YYC7-NCLM]. 
“Caution: Possible negative treatment indicated” is the full definition of the graphical signal. 
 34. Id. “Warning: Negative treatment is indicated” is the full definition of the graphical signal. 
 35. Id. “Questioned: Validity questioned by citing refs.” is the full definition of the graphical signal. 
 36. Id.
 37. I consulted two dictionaries in crafting the definitions that follow in this section: the Ameri-
cAn heritAge dictionAry of the english lAnguAge (2011); and BlAcK’s lAW dictionAry (Bryan A. 
Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014).
 38. As defined by BlAcK’s lAW dictionAry, supra note 37, at 560, “disagreement” means “[a] 
difference of opinion; a lack of agreement,” which is indeed close to the common use of the term. 
 39. “Reasonable doubt” is the only technical use of “doubt” in law I am familiar with; it has noth-
ing to do a judge’s determination, but rather a jury’s. 
 40. “Dicta” is the colloquial plural form of “obiter dictum,” which means “[a] judicial comment 
made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and 
therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).” BlAcK’s lAW dictionAry, 
supra note 37, at 1240. 
 41. “Follow,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, means “[t]o conform to or comply with; to 
accept as authority.” Id. at 759.
 42. The closest definition of “extend” provided by The American Heritage Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language is “to expand the influence of.” AmericAn heritAge dictionAry, supra note 37, at 626.
 43. “Rejection” has technical legal meaning in the law of contracts, but I am not aware of a clear 
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hybrids of words used commonly and as legal terms of art; they are therefore the 
most difficult to assess. I define the seven KeyCite analytical phrases as follows:
1. Called into doubt by—The Citing Case expresses uncertainty about the 
precedential value of the Target Case.
2. Criticized by—The Citing Case disagrees with the reasoning or result of 
the Target Case, although the citing court may not have the authority to 
materially affect its precedential value.44 
3. Declined to extend by—The judge in the Citing Case has chosen to not 
increase the influence of the Target Case. 
4. Declined to follow by—The judge in the Citing Case has chosen not to 
comply, conform with, or accept the Target Case as authoritative. 
5. Disagreed with by—The Citing Case expresses a difference of opinion or 
lack of agreement with the Target Case. 
6. Not followed as dicta—The court in the Citing Case will not accept the 
Target Case as authoritative because statements in the Target Case are con-
sidered to be unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential. 
7. Rejected by—The Citing Case declines to make use of reasoning from the 
Target Case. 
¶34 With these definitions in place, we may finally assess how accurately the 
citators apply their descriptions of subsequent negative treatment. As described in 
the methodology, determining which system is more accurate is also necessarily 
subjective—a matter of reading the relevant portions of each case and determining 
whether one explanatory phrase (or both, or none) more clearly describes the nature 
of the judicial determination in the Citing Case as it relates to the Target Case. While 
this seems difficult in theory, there were relatively few challenging decisions to make 
when reading and classifying a statement of subsequent negative treatment. 
¶35 Of the seventeen Target Cases (shown in table 3) with matching most nega-
tive Citing Cases, five had overlapping descriptions of subsequent negative treat-
ment. This occurred when the explanatory phrase was equally accurate in describing 
the subsequent negative treatment. For example, for the three Target Cases labeled 
as “criticized by” in Shepard’s, the KeyCite phrases “rejected by,” “declined to follow 
by,” and “disagreed with by,” as defined above, were for all purposes identical. United 
States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, a Target Case, is described as “criticized by” in 
Shepard’s and as “rejected by” in KeyCite. The Citing Case comments:
The Court rejects the suggestion in United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.Supp. 345, 373 (N.D.Ill.), 
aff ’d, sub nom. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1984), relied on by the gov-
ernment, that “[t]he test  . . . is not the state of the mind of ‘the government,’ but the state 
of mind of the affiant.” This Court treats the affiant as a representative of the United States 
government as to the activities of any of its agents, whether or not the affiant has been made 
aware of those activities.45 
technical decision in terms of precedent. The common meaning from The American Heritage Diction-
ary of the English Language is “refuse[d] . . . to make use of.” Id. at 1482.
 44. This definition is in effect identical to the Shepard’s definition. 
 45. Application for Interception of Wire Commc’ns, 2 F. Supp. 2d 177, 179 n.3 (D. Mass. 1998).
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¶36 The Citing Case, from a federal district court in the First Circuit, chooses 
not to apply a particular doctrinal rule used in the Target Case, from a federal dis-
trict court in the Seventh Circuit. It fits the definition of “criticized by” and the 
definition of “rejected by,” presented above. Therefore, the description of the sub-
sequent negative treatment has been accurately applied. 
Table 3
Seventeen Matching “Most Negative” Cases
Target Case Name Target Case 
Citation
Flag Color  
on WLN
Symbol on  
LEX
Classification  
on WLN
Classification 
on LEX
Gregory v. United 
States
369 F.2d 185 Yellow Q in Orange Box Criticized by Questioned by
McCurdy v. Steele 353 F. Supp. 629 Yellow Red Hexagon Declined to 
Follow by
Questioned by
United States v. 
DeCoster
487 F.2d 1197 Yellow Red Hexagon Called into 
Doubt by
Questioned by
Brandenburger v. 
Thompson
494 F.2d 885 Yellow Q in Orange Box Disagreed 
With by
Questioned by
Finley v. United States 404 F. Supp. 
200
Yellow Q in Orange Box Disagreed  
With by
Questioned by
United States v. 
Dorfman
542 F. Supp. 345 Yellow Red Hexagon Rejected by Criticized by
Melson v. Kroger Co. 578 F. Supp. 691 Yellow Q in Orange Box Disagreed  
With by
Questioned by
People v. Johnson 204 Cal. Rptr. 
563
Yellow Yellow Triangle Not Followed  
as Dicta
Criticized by
In re A & C Properties 784 F.2d 1377 Yellow Red Hexagon Declined to 
Follow by
Questioned by
Barber v. National 
Bank of Alaska
815 P.2d 857 Yellow Q in Orange Box Called into 
Doubt by
Questioned by
Stafford v. Purofied 
Down Products Corp.
801 F. Supp. 130 Yellow Red Hexagon Declined to 
Follow by
Questioned by
Mulhall v. Advance 
Sec., Inc.
19 F.3d 586 Yellow Yellow Triangle Declined to 
Follow by
Criticized by
Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc. v. Distajo
66 F.3d 438 Yellow Red Hexagon Disagreed  
With by
Criticized by
Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
Brown & Bryant, Inc.
159 F.3d 358 Yellow Red Hexagon Not Followed  
as Dicta
Criticized by
Reed v. Reed 48 S.W.3d 634 No Flag Red Hexagon Declined to 
Follow by
Overruled in 
part by
Security Ins. Co. v.  
Old Dominion Freight 
Line 
314 F. Supp.  
2d 201
Yellow Yellow Triangle Declined to 
Extend by
Distinguished  
by
Pequignot v. Solo  
Cup Co.
640 F. Supp.  
2d 714
Yellow Red Hexagon Declined to 
Follow by
Criticized by 
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¶37 But what about an instance from this group in which a descriptive phrase 
has been inaccurately applied? Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, a Target 
Case, is described in Shepard’s as “questioned by” but as “disagreed with by” in 
KeyCite. Only the phrase from Shepard’s accurately describes the negative prece-
dent here:
A third exception, known as the private attorney general theory, has been recognized by 
several lower courts when the expense of litigation may act as a deterrent to the bringing of 
private litigation deemed necessary to enforce important public policies. See, e.g., Taylor v. 
Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 
(1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). In Alyeska 
Pipeline the Supreme Court expressly disapproved the use of the private attorney general 
exception in federal courts.46 
The Target Case, we can see, is included by the Citing Case as part of a string cita-
tion of cases that have been implicitly overruled by a Supreme Court case. This kind 
of treatment is accurately described by Shepard’s “questioned by” phrase, but does 
not match at all with what “disagreed with by,” the KeyCite term, seems plainly to 
mean.
¶38 In the set of cases studied, eleven of seventeen, or 64.7% of descriptions of 
subsequent negative treatment in Shepard’s were applied accurately as shown in 
table 4. The KeyCite system applied descriptions of subsequent negative treatment 
accurately in nine of seventeen, or 52.9% of cases. Neither citator applied descrip-
tions of subsequent negative treatment accurately in two of the seventeen cases, or 
11.8% of the time for this set as shown in table 5. While the sample size studied is 
small and no conclusions can be reached about the ultimate comparative quality of 
this aspect of either citator, these data do suggest that each system describes the 
actions taken in identical Citing Cases with differing degrees of consistency.
¶39 The clear definitions in the hierarchical Shepard’s system allowed for further 
comparison of the data from the comparative set described above to a Shepard’s-
only set. A systematic sample from the remaining 85 cases in the set of 116 described 
above was taken. Alternating fourth or fifth cases were selected from the table sorted 
chronologically to help mitigate any bias from the date of a case. In total, 19 cases 
were selected from the 85 and subjected to the same analysis as the set of 17 above. 
In 14 of the 19 cases in the Shepard’s-only set, subsequent negative treatment from 
a Citing Case was accurately described by the analytical phrase. That is, 73.6% of the 
time, Shepard’s, according to its own standards, described the subsequent negative 
treatment accurately. A similar test of the KeyCite system for the same set of cases 
was not performed since KeyCite gives no clear definitions for its explanatory 
phrases. 
¶40 These results, it can be argued, offer no definitive conclusions of any kind 
about how accurately a given citator describes subsequent negative treatment in 
case law. This is an argument I ultimately accept—a truly systematic study of the 
topic is likely impossible given the number of variables that could affect its results. 
For instance, factors such as chronology, the presence of direct procedural history 
(Taylor’s “related opinions”), consistent application of the phrases by LexisNexis or 
 46. Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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Thomson Reuters, and the case identified as “most negative” could each present 
different findings. Each variable might be controlled for on its own, but controlling 
for all at once seems exceedingly difficult. However, I do believe that by articulating 
a methodology for studying citators and offering a detailed picture of interpreting 
and operationalizing accuracy of application of subsequent negative treatment is 
valuable in its own right.
Table 4
Accurate Classification in Either or Both Citation Indexes 
Target Case Name Target Case  
Citation
Classification  
on WLN
Classification  
on LEX
Accurately 
Classified Within
Gregory v. United States 369 F.2d 185 Criticized by Questioned by KeyCite Only
McCurdy v. Steele 353 F. Supp. 629 Declined to  
Follow by
Questioned by Shepard’s Only
Brandenburger v. 
Thompson
494 F.2d 885 Disagreed  
With by
Questioned by Shepard’s Only
Finley v. United States 404 F. Supp. 200 Disagreed  
With by
Questioned by Shepard’s Only
United States v. Dorfman 542 F. Supp. 345 Rejected by Criticized by Both
People v. Johnson 204 Cal. Rptr. 563 Not Followed  
as Dicta
Criticized by KeyCite Only
In re A & C Properties 784 F.2d 1377 Declined to  
Follow by
Questioned by Both
Barber v. National Bank 
of Alaska
815 P.2d 857 Called into  
Doubt by
Questioned by KeyCite Only
Stafford v. Purofied  
Down Products Corp.
801 F. Supp. 130 Declined to  
Follow by
Questioned by KeyCite Only
Mulhall v. Advance Sec., 
Inc.
19 F.3d 586 Declined to  
Follow by
Criticized by Both
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. 
v. Distajo
66 F.3d 438 Disagreed  
With by
Criticized by Both
Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown 
& Bryant, Inc.
159 F.3d 358 Not Followed  
as Dicta
Criticized by Shepard’s Only
Reed v. Reed 48 S.W.3d 634 Declined to  
Follow by
Overruled in  
part by
Shepard’s Only
Security Ins. Co. v. Old 
Dominion Freight Line 
314 F. Supp.  
2d 201
Declined to  
Extend by
Distinguished by Both
Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co. 640 F. Supp.  
2d 714
Declined to  
Follow by
Criticized by Shepard’s Only 
Table 5
Inaccurate Classification in Both Citation Indexes 
Target Case Name Target Case Citation Classification on WLN Classification on LEX
United States v. DeCoster 487 F.2d 1197 Called into Doubt by Questioned by
Melson v. Kroger Co. 578 F. Supp. 691 Disagreed With by Questioned by
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¶41 There are other indicia of accuracy in application descriptions of subsequent 
negative treatment: namely, the consistency with which cases are tagged with a cita-
tor’s iconography. In the set of 116 cases, KeyCite assigns the Yellow Flag to 18 dif-
ferent explanatory phrases. The 18 explanatory phrases are not evenly distributed—
two phrases, “declined to follow by” and “distinguished by,” account for 51 of the 116 
cases. In the larger set of 227 Yellow Flag cases (containing related opinions and 
unrelated opinions), KeyCite assigns 57 different explanatory phrases. 
¶42 Shepard’s iconography was studied only in the set of 116 unrelated opinions. 
Seven of the 116 assigned no subsequent negative treatment and are excluded from 
this part of the analysis. Of the remaining 109 cases, 37 were assigned the Yellow 
Triangle, 20 were assigned the Q in Orange Box, and 52 were assigned the Red Hexa-
gon. Of the 37 cases assigned the Yellow Triangle, four explanatory phrases were 
applied, with two phrases, “criticized by” and “distinguished by,” accounting for 35 
of the 37 cases. Of the 20 cases assigned the Q in Orange Box, all 20 were given the 
“questioned by” analytical phrase. Finally, of the 52 Red Hexagon cases, Shepard’s 
assigned fifteen analytical phrases. Some of the Red Hexagon cases included related 
opinions in the Shepard’s report that were not captured by KeyCite, so for a mean-
ingful comparison, it makes sense to look at the Yellow Triangle and Q in Orange 
Box cases. For the 57 such cases, only five phrases are applied, and three of the five 
phrases account for 55 of the 57, or 96.5%. Looking at this metric, the value of a 
controlled visual vocabulary is apparent when considering the accuracy of applica-
tion of descriptions, albeit visual descriptions, of subsequent negative treatment. It 
seems fair to conclude that a user encountering the Shepard’s Yellow Triangle and Q 
in Orange Box iconography for a Target Case would have a clear understanding of 
the type of subsequent negative treatment contained in the Citing Case. The user 
encountering a Yellow Flag on KeyCite—at least on a superficial level—would not 
likely know what meaning to make of the symbol. 
Looking Forward: A Discussion of the Citator’s Place
 ¶43 Questions about the use of online citators—particularly their presenta-
tion of graphical symbols as units of meaning—are not new among teachers of 
legal research.47 A survey of the literature suggests that qualifications about the 
adequacy of these symbols form an integral part of lessons and texts on updating 
cases and statutes.48 Even the most basic legal research text cautions that citators’ 
“signals and editorial signposts are not authoritative statements of the law” and that 
there is “no substitute for reading a citing document and determining for yourself 
its scope and effect.”49 These same texts, however, note that citators are “helpful as 
. . . starting place[s]”50 in determining a case’s continuing validity and should be 
considered “invaluable resources . . . [ensuring] that cases are still good law.”51 
¶44 Marketing materials from LexisNexis and WestlawNext paint their citators 
as practically infallible. “Why do so many judges and lawyers rely on Shepard’s 
 47. Kent C. Olson, Waiving a Red Flag: Teaching Counterintuitiveness in Citator Use, 9 PersP.: 
teAching legAl res. & Writing 58, 58 (2001).
 48. See, e.g., Armstrong & Knott, supra note 3, at 135.
 49. cohen & olson, supra note 3, at 115.
 50. Armstrong & Knott, supra note 3, at 135.
 51. cohen & olson, supra note 3, at 109.
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Citations Service, exclusively from LexisNexis®, when it comes to validating 
research?” The answer? “It’s a matter of trust.”52 Likewise, KeyCite materials tout 
“West’s 125-year tradition of editorial excellence” and the company’s “leading-edge 
technological expertise” in suggesting that users can “instantly verify whether a case 
. . . is good law.”53 Of course, as Wolf and Wishart point out, these statements are 
largely meaningless, if not misleading, marketing attempts to differentiate prod-
ucts.54 It can be tempting to believe these kinds of statements based on the credibil-
ity of the source,55 not to mention the cost of the product.56 But savvy legal 
researchers know—and legal research instructors profess—that there is no side-
stepping the need to read a case and use professional judgment to determine the 
precedential effect of later-citing cases. Still, citators are seen as essential compo-
nents of legal research databases.57
¶45 In light of this study’s results, researchers have even greater reason to doubt 
the adequacy of citators’ determination. More troubling, perhaps, is the implicit 
boost that some instructional texts give to citators by identifying them as a “good 
starting place” or “invaluable resources.” Indeed, if the graphical signals and the 
explanatory phrases cannot be trusted to be applied accurately—at best, approxi-
mately seventy-five percent of the time, or at worst, less than fifty percent of the 
time—it is difficult to see how descriptions of subsequent negative treatment 
would reliably set the researcher down the correct path. It could be argued that the 
presence of any negative symbol or phrase is enough to alert the user that “here 
there be dragons”58 and therefore, a concurrent need to read and understand the 
“flagged” case before citing it.59 This argument is easily countered, however, by the 
fact that not reading a case before citing it is almost certainly a violation of Rule 1.1 
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, requiring a lawyer to provide 
“competent representation to a client[,]” a duty defined as consisting of, among 
other things, “thoroughness and preparation.”60 So, if a tap on the shoulder from a 
 52. citAtion services: deeP AnAlysis And unique Product detAils leAd reseArchers to 
shePArd’s citAtions service At lexis.com (2012), https://www.lexisnexis.com/pdf/Shep%20and%20
KCite%20Comp%20Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4JV-5G2T].
 53. Keycite on WestlAW next, supra note 25.
 54. Wolf & Wishart, supra note 15, at 27.
 55. Bob Berring calls this the “Tinkerbell” effect. He writes: “In the Walt Disney animated feature 
‘Peter Pan,’ Tinkerbell was a fairy. She only existed if children believed in her existence. This character, 
viewed by the author at an impressionable age, stands for the classic bootstrapping of authorita-
tiveness.” Robert C. Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified, 12 
BerKeley tech. l.J. 189, 193 n.17 (1997). The term was later used by Mary Whisner. Mary Whisner, 
Bouvier’s, Black’s, and Tinkerbell, 92 lAW liBr. J. 99, 2000 lAW liBr. J. 8. The extension of the idea to 
citators specifically is my choice alone.
 56. Hilke Plassmann et al., Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of Experi-
enced Pleasantness, 105 Proc. nAt’l AcAd. sci. u.s.A. 1050, 1051 (2008). 
 57. Greg Lambert, Casemaker Unique Among Legal Research Providers, 89 mich. B.J. 54, 56 
(2010).
 58. This phrase comes to mind because of an article on a slightly different topic in legal research. 
See Peggy Roebuck Jarrett & Mary Whisner, “Here There Be Dragons”: How to Do Research in an Area 
You Know Nothing About, 6 PersP.: teAching legAl res. & Writing 74 (1998).
 59. More appropriately, the relevant portion of the case. See Robert C. Berring, Unprecedented 
Precedent: Ruminations on the Meaning of It All, 5 green BAg 2d 245 (2002).
 60. Am. BAr Ass’n, model rules of ProfessionAl conduct 11 (2011). This is assumed from the 
work done in Bast & Harrell, supra note 5. Likewise, there are no cases specifically on point in Kris-
tina L. Niedringhaus, Ethics Considerations Related to Legal Research Practices: A Selective Annotated 
Bibliography, 31 legAl reference servs. q. 104 (2012).
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citator, even without any further intelligible explanation, means “read the case,” the 
question remains: where’s the value in that? A competent researcher will expect to 
do this anyways.
¶46 To justify their continued use, then, citators must add some value to the 
research process, not because they are thought of as “invaluable” but because they 
are precisely the opposite—important components of rather costly legal research 
databases. To explore this problem, the discussion first considers the citator’s origin 
and then how citators as currently constituted can be used beneficially (or, one 
could say, profitably) by researchers. Next I examine how citators might fit in a legal 
research environment with a multiplicity of tools for determining the meaning of 
subsequent negative treatment. Finally, I look to fruitful areas for further research 
on evaluating the quality of citators.
¶47 The roots of legal citation indexes in the United States stretch to the early 
nineteenth century, before they were known as citators.61 Ogden credits preeminent 
jurist and scholar Joseph Story with the idea of applying an “explanatory letter” 
such as D for doubted or O for overruled to a table of cases included in a reporter 
volume.62 The earliest popular citation index existed for much the same purpose as 
the contemporary citators—efficient identification of a case’s subsequent negative 
treatment. The title of the volumes produced over a lifetime by Simon Greenleaf, 
Greenleaf ’s Overruled Cases, explains itself.63 Other early citation indexes were also 
compiled by individuals, almost always at first for their creator’s personal use.64 But 
the coming of the twentieth century brought a growth in the country’s urban popu-
lation and commercial activity, which led to an increase in the number of courts 
(and reorganization of those courts), and eventually to a consequent explosion of 
the number of published precedential legal documents, such as appellate opin-
ions.65 In addition to figuring out how to organize these cases, interested parties in 
the profession, namely lawyers, law librarians, and the growing national publishers, 
needed to find a way to make sense of this ever-expanding stuff of law.66 
¶48 Until the digital era in legal publishing, and through its first generation, 
Shepard’s was the only national citator capable of accomplishing this comprehen-
sive task.67 While not originally conceived as a facsimile of the print version, 
Shepard’s online soon took on many of the functions, and idiosyncrasies, of the 
print volumes.68 But its purpose remained the same—identifying precedential pro-
cedural and citing history in a comprehensive and current fashion. What digital 
publication of legal materials added, however, was the ability to generate a so-called 
table of authority for a given document, such as a case. That is, it was suddenly 
possible to extract information about which cases cited other cases and how often 
 61. Ogden, supra note 6, is the canonical history.
 62. Id. at 4.
 63. Id. at 6. Greenleaf was a close friend and colleague of Justice Story. 
 64. Id. at 23.
 65. For an interesting, summary discussion of this problem, see Richard A. Danner, The ABA, the 
AALL, the AALS, and the “Duplication of Legal Publications,” 104 lAW liBr. J. 485, 488, 2012 lAW liBr. 
J. 35, ¶ 6.
 66. This is an analogy to one of the main theses from BoWKer & stAr, supra note 7, at 16. In that 
work, the context is epidemiological classification. 
 67. Dabney, supra note 6, contains an excellent, detailed history of the development of KeyCite 
in addition to a history of Shepard’s in the late twentieth century.
 68. Id. at 170.
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a given case was cited, among other things. KeyCite includes graphical representa-
tions of a case’s direct procedural history, while both services include extensive lists 
of Citing Cases, regardless of whether the treatments within are approving, nega-
tive, or neutral. 
¶49 Given the change in the nature of citation analysis possible in the digital 
realm and the shaky performances of both systems in accurately describing sub-
stantive negative history, it is fair to ask whether the era of the citator qua citator 
has already passed. Instead of conceptualizing these indexes of citations as tools 
reliably identifying both the existence and nature of subsequent negative history, 
and therefore essential steps in “updating” legal research, it seems more appropriate 
to relieve these tools of the moniker they have acquired and the related heavy, if not 
impossible, burden associated with it. A legal citation index cannot, on its own, say 
whether a Target Case is bad law. It certainly cannot say if a case is good law. And, 
as discussed earlier, any legal researcher relying on a citator to do so is almost cer-
tainly professionally incompetent. This raises the question, hinted at earlier, of 
what legal citation indexes are still good for. To put it more circumspectly, what is 
the tool-known-as-citator’s place in legal research now and in the future?
¶50 Currently, legal citation indexes can gather a wide range of subsequent cit-
ing authority. KeyCite is more explicit about displaying these sources—including 
statutes citing the Target Case as well as secondary sources like law reviews, trea-
tises, or looseleaf series. The same variety of sources is also available in Shepard’s, 
though the interface makes it a bit more difficult to find. Both products include a 
table of authorities cited within the Target Case. KeyCite also includes a unique 
feature, measuring the depth of treatment in citing court documents. This measure 
is likely calculated based on how often the Target Case is cited or mentioned in the 
citing document, and how many words separate the citation from the next different 
citation. Thomson Reuters (the parent company of WestlawNext) does not disclose 
how its depth-of-treatment algorithm functions, naturally, so the prior statement 
represents my best guess. Neither system provides other types of symbols or 
explanatory phrases to describe other later-citing authorities.
¶51 Legal research instructors need to emphasize these features of citation 
analysis currently available in both major citators while explaining potential prob-
lems with the descriptions of subsequent negative treatment in the later-citing 
cases when provided. Also, the notion of a citator as a tool for updating research 
must be expanded—the citation index, when integrated into the larger research 
platform, can serve a vital function throughout the research process. Examining 
the dates of later-citing cases (are there any that are current?) or the jurisdiction or 
court level of later-citing cases (will the decisions be binding precedent?) are two 
basic examples. Rethinking the citator as a tool for analyzing the influence of a case 
based on later citations in a variety of sources is needed, rather than calling it a final 
box to tick to ensure the validity of a case’s proposition as good law. 
¶52 Lawyers and legal information professionals also must continue to critique 
and qualify the marketing or training materials created by WestlawNext and Lexis-
Nexis about their respective citator products. As the literature cited in this article 
shows, much good work has already been done in this and related areas, and should 
continue. Law students and practicing attorneys need to be made aware of the 
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implicit overruling problem,69 the inclusion or exclusion of unpublished opinions,70 
the misleading nature of certain graphical representations of precedent,71 and of 
course, the inaccuracy in how symbols and explanatory phrases are used to signal 
subsequent negative treatment. Additionally, it cannot be left to the information 
vendors to teach how these products work,72 especially if citators are being pre-
sented as tools for instantly confirming or disconfirming the validity of a point of 
law in a given Target Case. 
¶53 Beyond teaching what citators can and should do well presently, looking to 
the future is necessary too. There, new tools will assume some of the traditional 
citator’s functions, and market needs and competition will push WestlawNext and 
LexisNexis to reimagine their current products. Startup companies already are pro-
ducing new-wave citation analysis tools based on algorithmic extraction of citation 
data, presenting information about case citation networks visually.73 Researchers no 
longer need to rely solely on the textual representation of citation data when ana-
lyzing precedent.74 Also intriguing is the possible application of machine-learning 
algorithms or artificial intelligence to legal systems. And while two recent articles 
on the topic do not mention the application to citators specifically, the authors do 
stress that teasing out the relationship between cases is a potential application of 
this technology.75 While a fully automated citator with accurate descriptions of 
subsequent negative treatment may be far in the offing, more options for conduct-
ing citation analysis outside of the bounds of traditional citators have already 
arrived. 
¶54 One hope for this article is that it will encourage more commentary on cita-
tors generally and on their descriptions of subsequent negative treatment specifi-
cally. The analysis here does not satisfactorily answer several questions it raises. For 
instance, does a hierarchical controlled vocabulary improve the accuracy in how 
citators apply their descriptions of subsequent negative treatment? Could the 
observed results instead be due to differences in how consistently individual ser-
vices apply these descriptions? Or does the absence of any definitions of explana-
tory phrases in KeyCite make the idea of consistent application impossible? On the 
contrary, might the KeyCite terms actually represent narrower terms of broader 
 69. Wolf & Wishart, supra note 15, at 31.
 70. Mart, supra note 12, at 44, n.3.
 71. Olson, supra note 47, at 60 (arguing that the red hexagon should be thought to mean “go” 
rather than “stop”).
 72. This, as it applies to law students, is not a new argument. See Shawn Nevers, Candy, Points, 
and Highlighters: Why Librarians, Not Vendors, Should Teach CALR to First-Year Students, 99 lAW liBr. 
J. 757, 2007 lAW liBr. J. 46.
 73. The best example of this is Ravel Law. See About Us, rAvel lAW, https://www.ravellaw.com 
/about (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/BTF5-884H]. Fastcase also makes use of visual 
representations of precedent in its Authority Check tool.
 74. Susan Azyndar, Katrina Lee & Ingrid Mattson, A New Era: Integrating Today’s “Next Gen” 
Research Tools Ravel and Casetext in the Law School Classroom, 41 rutgers comPuter & tech. l.J. 31, 
69 (2015).
 75. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 emory l.J. 909, 955 
(2013); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WAsh. l. rev. 87, 109 (2014).
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Shepard’s analogues, which then form a kind of implicit hierarchical controlled 
vocabulary? Or do the phrases exist simply as snippets, used to distinguish among 
cases without actually categorizing the subsequent negative treatment contained 
within? 
¶55 Other areas for research that I see as particularly helpful are exploring fur-
ther what the idea of comprehensiveness in a citator means. To that end,  research-
ers might estimate how many cases present in the case law databases have ever been 
cited by another case, and, if a case has been cited, what is the mean number of 
times it has been cited? Of this number, how many of those citing references would 
be negative? Knowing how to best ask and answer these types of quantitative ques-
tions would likely be of aid to researchers looking to benchmark observed qualita-
tive phenomena. Would the necessarily subjective descriptions of negative subse-
quent precedent make sense to duplicate if one were to start building a citator 
today or, as I suspect, would the making of meaning take some other, more infer-
ential path? That is, what would the modern-day Story emphasize as important to 
the modern-day Greenleaf? 
¶56 More prosaically, it should be noted that Shepard’s has a different iconog-
raphy and user interface on the new Lexis Advance platform, which was not tested 
here. (KeyCite on WestlawNext was chosen because Thomson Reuters was begin-
ning to phase out Westlaw Classic at the time this research began; it has now com-
pleted the transition.) Tests on this system, which seems on cursory examination 
to incorporate a depth-of-treatment element, could yield different results. Like-
wise, would an examination of, say, the three most negative cases lead to greater 
correspondence between the Citing Cases presented by each service? 
¶57 Finally, a direct invitation to both LexisNexis and Thomson Reuters: please, 
critique my work. Present verifiable studies with publicly available data to justify 
advertising claims concerning subsequent negative treatment and the value a cita-
tor adds to the legal research platforms on the whole. Similarly, does the cost asso-
ciated with producing descriptions of subsequent negative treatment make sense 
given the inaccuracy in application found here? If so, why should lawyers and legal 
professionals of all stripes—in large law firms, government, or legal education—
continue to pay the ever-rising fees attached to your services? The call is not terri-
bly complicated: show us why the systems, as currently construction, actually meet 
lawyers’ research needs.
Conclusion 
¶58 Citators are expected to accurately describe subsequent negative treatment, 
an expectation that dates to their beginning in the United States. This study sought 
to answer the question of whether a system, such as Shepard’s Citations, employing 
a hierarchical controlled vocabulary, would apply descriptions of subsequent nega-
tive treatment more accurately than a system, such as KeyCite, lacking a hierarchical 
controlled vocabulary. To reach a meaningful conclusion, a large set of cases with 
later-citing history was narrowed until a fair comparison could be made. The results 
of this comparison suggest that the presence of a hierarchical controlled vocabulary 
produces more accurate descriptions of subsequent negative treatment. 
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¶59 To this point, the relevant scholarly literature has been largely silent on 
descriptions of negative precedent in law. Some comparisons of citators for other 
factors have been done, and considerable writing by legal information professionals 
has critiqued the overall trustworthiness of citators. This article addresses the gap 
and provides a framework for assessing particular elements of citators. But an 
important goal of scholarship in library and information science is to make con-
crete suggestions for improvement, which this article does in discussing the best use 
of citators given the results of the study. Citators remain valuable tools as citation 
indexes, gathering all later-citing history from a variety of primary and secondary 
sources. But in providing descriptions of subsequent negative treatment, citators 
seem tied to an antiquated historical model originating in the early nineteenth 
century. Their lackluster performance in this area suggests they are failing at the 
task deemed so central to their existence. Law librarians and legal educators and 
scholars must continue to examine the tools we use to evaluate the law so as best to 
communicate its meaning to those we serve.   
